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Abstract. Wireless sensors and measurement devices are widely deployed in oil
and gas refineries to monitor the health of the pipes. These sensors are deployed
along the pipes in an open area and thus are subject to large scale failures due to
cyber-physical attacks and hazardous environments. In this paper, we study the
resilience issues in collecting data from a dense and large scale set of sensors
deployed over the physical refinery pipe network. We construct a multi-tree
sensor mesh network over the refinery sensors for data collection. The reporting
messages within one of the trees, while passing along the tree, are protected
by a secret key shared among all sensors on the tree. Our construction aims
to minimize the data collection time and ensures that the information leakage
probability of the secret key is bounded. To tolerate large scale failures, we
present a distributed self-healing protocol, which enables a tree node to discover
a secondary path when its parent fails. The simulation result shows that the
self-healing protocol tolerates large scale failures with high probability and has
small overhead in data collection time.
1. Introduction
To monitor the health of oil and gas refineries, wireless sensors and measurement de-
vices are massively installed to collect various real-time measurements like tempera-
ture, pressure and corrosion [1–4]. Several standards such as ISA100.11a [5] and Wire-
lessHART [6] are actively updated for industrial applications. These wireless devices
form a wireless mesh network and pass the monitoring data through a gateway to the con-
trol center to facilitate robust monitoring and control. As the sensors are often deployed
around pipes in an open area, they may be subject to different forms of attacks and dam-
ages, and thus become faulty after installation. For example, the sensors around pipes can
be damaged in pipe fire or compromised by attackers.
Fast response to abnormal behaviors and situational awareness is very important
to reduce the risk and scope of accidents. A reliable communication network is thus
necessary to ensure that alert messages can be delivered in time. Therefore, the data col-
lection infrastructure should be resilient in a way that sensors should be accessible even if
some relays fail. Although both ISA 100.11a and WirelessHART introduce redundancy of
gateways and paths as the reliability enhancement [7, 8], sensors can still be inaccessible
under large scale failures.
In addition to network reliability, information security is also an important issue
in the refinery sensor network. For the sensor network that uses a shared key, leakage of
this shared key enables an attacker to impersonate or eavesdrop the sensing devices. Both
ISA 100.11a and WirelessHART support a shared join key that a device can authenticate
itself to the gateway [9]. Protecting the shared keys should be a major security concern of
the system administrator.
In this paper, we design a resilient data collection framework which provides re-
liability under large scale failures and protection of shared security key. We consider the
scenario where a large number of wireless measurement devices (MDs) are deployed in
a dense refinery sensor network. Each MD is capable of communicating with nearby
devices within a small range. A subset of MDs are selected as access points (AP) and
attached to the gateway. MDs that are not connected to the gateway directly relay their
data through the mesh network. Fig. 1 shows an example topology with ten MDs con-
necting to three access points MD1, MD6 and MD9. The arrows represent the uplinks of
each MD. We show the unused communication links of MD7 by dashed lines. Therefore
in this example, MD7 can communicate with MD2, MD6, MD8 and MD9 by short-range
wireless communication.
Figure 1. An Example Topology
The multi-tree structure is easy to maintain as each node only needs to keep track
of its parent and children. Besides, as the MDs are divided into disjoint trees rooted at
different nodes, data traffic becomes isolated, and data protection becomes easier. For
example, when we want to encrypt a command for distributing among the trees, different
tree can use a different security key. This security key can then be selected according to
the different situations of the tree. A tree with nodes that may be compromised easier
can opt for using a longer key or refreshing the key more frequently. Moreover, in case
a key of a certain tree is leaked, the other trees are still safe. In our formulation for tree
construction, we will consider the leakage probability of the security key used.
Before the first data collection, the tree collection structure is computed by a sys-
tem administrator (SA) based on the network topology. The SA then informs the MDs
about their neighbors, parent, and children to build the data collection paths. The time to
collect data on a certain tree is related to the height of the tree. Since each tree can col-
lect data simultaneously, the amount of time needed to collect data from the forest is the
maximum height of all trees. We formulate the Resilient Data Collection Forest Problem
(RDCFP) using mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) to optimize the overall data
collection time with the consideration of key security.
After the tree structure is setup, it will be used for multiple data collection rounds.
Since the MDs are exposed to an insecure physical environment, an MD may fail and
stop working. This failed MD cannot relay data for its descendant MDs anymore. At
this point, tree re-construction is needed. In a dense network, an MD has an adequate
number of neighbors within its communication range, so that it can find another path
among its neighbors to connect with SA when its parent fails. Therefore, we adopt the
self-healing approach that nodes affected would try to establish their data reporting paths
locally through negotiating with neighbors. With proper heuristics in path selection, the
data collection time after self-healing does not increase significantly compared with the
optimal forest.
Our main contributions in this paper can be summarized as follows:
• We designed a resilient data collection framework for the refinery sensor network
which has built-in reliability and security features.
• We proposed a distributed self-healing protocol to tolerate large scale simultane-
ous relay failures.
• We optimized the data collection time by formulating the forest construction prob-
lem using MILP.
• We evaluated the self-healing protocol on refinery pipeline simulator and compare
the reliability of self-healing protocol to the approach adopted by WirelessHART.
2. Related Work
Tree-based data collection in sensor networks has been actively studied [10–12]. Most
work aims at optimizing energy usage or sensor lifetime while reducing data reporting
latency. Due to the massive number of sensors, a hierarchical data collection structure
is usually adopted. Cluster heads are selected to collect data from sensors within its
neighborhood, and then reports the data to the data sink. Some recent studies on how to
select cluster heads to balance energy and latency can be found in [13, 14]. As energy
harvesting has been proposed to prolong the lifetime of a sensor, some researchers study
data collection with this emerging technology [15, 16]. To reduce traffic, compression
techniques are studied to improve the data collection performance [17, 18].
A major class of fault tolerance and recovery techniques in wireless sensor net-
works exploit the link or path redundancy in the network. In a multi-path structure, pack-
ets are routed through disjoint backup paths when the primary path fails [19, 20]. The
resilience of WirelessHART is achieved by a special multi-path structure [8], where each
intermediate node on the path must have at least two neighbors to forward the traffic.
However, this approach does not consider the shared key security and we will show that
its performance under large scale failure is not satisfactory in section 6.
3. System Model
3.1. Network Model
We consider the network model as a set of MDs {MD1,MD2, · · · ,MDn} densely placed in
a 3-dimensional space. All the MDs have an identical short communication range R and
thus form an underlying communication network. Two MDs are considered as neighbors
if their distance is no larger than R and can communicate with each other directly.
A subset of r MDs {MDi1,MDi2, · · · ,MDir} are given as roots (access points).
Each non-root MD is connected to one of the roots in a multi-hop manner and thus forms
a forest in the network. For the rest of the paper, we also use the term group referring to
a set of MDs in the same tree.
3.2. Security Model
The data reported by each MD should be protected in terms of both integrity and confi-
dentiality. The data should be read only by the SA, but not intermediate MDs which help
relaying the data. On the other hand, the intermediate MDs should be able to authenticate
the relayed message in order to defend data injection attacks [21, 22].
Similar to [23], we develop the secure tree-based data collection framework that
allows MDs to report private data to SA while facilitating intermediate MDs to authen-
ticate the messages. Diffie-Hellman key exchange is used to establish an encryption key
for the data between SA and every MD. Integrity check along the tree path is supported
by a group key which is known by all members in the tree.
If an adversary knows the group key, he can stealthily inject forged messages into
the network. This immediately leads to vulnerabilities such as data injection attack and
denial-of-service attack. A secure protocol should confine the risk of leaking a key to a
certain acceptable bound. To model the group key leakage probability, we assume that
each MD leaks the key with a certain probability. The key leakage probabilities of the
MDs can then be used to develop the probability of leaking the group key to an adversary.
Our protocol ensures this probability is not greater a predefined threshold. Different MDs
may have different key leakage probabilities as the MDs in an oil refinery are subject to
different risks according to the positions and functions.
A risk introduced by using the group key is that, if an adversary knows the group
key, he can inject arbitrary messages without being detected by the integrity check. Al-
though the SA can finally detect the data carried in the message are not legitimate, network
resource can be exhausted in transmitting the messages. As the MDs may be exposed in
an open environment, there is a risk that the group key is leaked from a group member. We
model the leakage probability of MDi to be pi, and control the risk of group key leakage
under a security threshold Pth.
3.3. Resilience Model
Apart from security attacks, MDs along the pipes are subject to physical damages that they
may fail and stop functioning. When an MD fails and stops, it can no longer report data
or relay messages for other MDs. More precisely in a tree-based data collection scheme,
a failed MD would lead to the loss of the data of its whole subtree. To avoid this from
happening, the data collection structure has to be resilient so that when a certain node
fails, the loss of data should be minimal. Our resilience strategy is to design a distributed
self-healing protocol, where MDs are able to find a secondary data path to the SA when
their parents fail.
We consider the fail-stop model for all MDs, i.e., once an MD fails, it does not
recover. We consider at most k− 1 simultaneous failures for each data collection round
where k is the number of neighbors for each MD, and suppose that at least one root does
not fail. Furthermore, we assume that failures are detected before a data collection round
happens, i.e., the secondary paths should have been turned on when a data collection
command arrives.
4. Protocol Design
4.1. Protocol Overview
After the MDs are deployed, we first compute the initial multi-tree data collection struc-
ture. This is done by the SA which has the full topology information and the key leakage
probability of each MD. After the data collection structure is developed, SA tells each
root its tree structure. Each tree root can then distribute the relevant sub-tree structure
to each of its children. The process continues until each node knows its parent and its
children (if any).
To protect the data, security keys have to be used. Necessary keys can be estab-
lished and distributed in the process of setting up the trees. In [23], we describe how
to develop various keys on a tree to protect the data reported by each MD. Our resilient
data collection protocol in this paper does not assume any particular cryptographic mech-
anism to be used or how the data are protected through the keys. Instead, we consider the
generic situation that there is a group key shared among all the MDs on a tree and the risk
of leaking this key by each MD is known. Our protocol would ensure the risk of leaking
this group key is bounded in the data collection structure.
4.2. Self-healing
The self-healing protocol aims at recovering network connectivity after some MDs fail.
Two properties must be held after the self-healing process: (1) the risk of leaking any
group key is small; (2) the data collection time is short. To maintain these properties,
two types of information, accumulative leakage probability and subtree height, must be
spread through the group members.
Accumulative Leakage Probability Sharing a group key introduces extra security con-
cern because an attacker can steal the group key from any of the group members. We
model the key leakage probability of MDi as pi, which is a pre-defined parameter while
deploying the MD. Then, the accumulative leakage probability of a tree T can be ex-
pressed as
Pleak(T ) = 1−∏
i∈T
(1− pi) .
In order to control the risk, we require the leakage probability on every tree to be
smaller than a predefined threshold Pleak(T )≤ Pth. Therefore, we have
Pleak(T ) = 1−∏
i∈T
(1− pi)≤ Pth. (1)
As keys are distributed, we also notify each MD about the tree structure and the
leakage probability of its group members. Therefore, MDi can compute the accumulative
probability of its tree T and check if the following constraint holds
∑
j
log(1− p j)≥ log(1−Pth), ∀MD j ∈T .
This can be derived by taking log(·) for both sides in inequality (1). We will use the
accumulative leakage probability in the log form in the rest of our interpretation.
This constraint implies that the number of members in a group is upper-bounded.
A group cannot admit a new set of MDs if the accumulative leakage probability will
exceed the security threshold. Therefore, we define group capacity as the difference be-
tween security threshold and the current accumulative leakage probability of the group.
Suppose MD j is in tree T . The group capacity CT can be expressed as
CT = log(1−Pth)−∑
k
log(1− pk), ∀MDk ∈T .
CT ≤ 0 must hold for all groups.
As MDi has the information about the structure of its subtree, it can compute the
accumulative leakage probability of its subtree. If the group capacities for its neighbors
are also given, it can locally determine which neighbor can be a valid candidate for a
secondary path.
Extra Tree Height If there are multiple candidates for the secondary parent, we should
find the best secondary parent so that the self-healing would add to the least extra data
collection time. The data collection time on a tree depends on the highest tree branch.
We denote the height of a subtree rooted at MD j as H j. If MDi joins the subtree rooted at
MD j, the extra tree height added to the whole tree is
max(0, Hi−H j +1).
We use the example topology in Figure 1 for further explanation. Suppose MD6
fails and MD7 is looking for a secondary parent from MD2 and MD9. Assume both G1
and G3 will not break the group capacity constraint by accepting this request. In this case,
the height of subtree at MD2, MD9 and MD7 are 2, 1 and 1 correspondingly. If MD7 joins
G3, it turns out that the data collection time of G3 will increase from 1 to 2. However, by
joining G1, there is no extra height added to G1 because G1 already has a longer branch
MD1←MD2←MD3←MD5.
Self-healing Protocol Now we start describing the detail of the protocol. Once MDi
detects a parent failure, it broadcasts a join message signed by its private sign key. While
deploying the MDs, we require each MD to store a list of public keys of its neighbors.
Thus, the neighbors of MDi can verify if the join message comes from a valid peer by
verifying the signature. Once the join request is authenticated, each neighbor MD j replies
with a join-ack message. To facilitate the choice of secondary parent, the group capacity
and subtree height of MD j is included in this message.
After MDi receives all the join-acks, it computes the accumulative leakage prob-
ability of its subtree and uses the group capacity to determine a set of neighbors whose
group can admit the whole subtree. If there are multiple candidate, it selects one with the
least extra tree height. A join-proposal message is then sent to the selected neighbor. This
message includes the accumulative leakage probability of MDi’s subtree.
Competing Requests When multiple failures happen simultaneously in the system, a
group can receive several join request at the same time. If every group member approves
these requests independently, it may result in the violation of the security constraint.
To resolve the conflict, we require MD j to forward the join-proposal to its tree
root and wait for the approval from the root. The tree root approve the request based
on first-come-first-serve criteria, and replies with an approval or disapproval message to
MD j.
Group Update As soon as approving the join-proposal, the root MD also broadcasts the
updated membership list down to all the members in the tree. In this way, every member
can be notified about the join of MDi and update the membership list as well as the group
capacity.
After joining the new group, the MDi and all the MDs in its subtree need to obtain
the new group key used in the tree of MD j. After getting approval from the root, MD j
sends MDi its group key encrypted using PKI. MDi continues to forward the group key
down to its subtree until every MD in the subtree gets the new group key.
Pruning Sometimes MDi may find that it is impossible to join any of its neighbors’
trees. This is more likely to happen when the accumulative leakage probability of MDi’
subtree is large. In order to reconstruct the trees, MDi must prune some branches on
its subtree so that the remainder of the subtree is small enough. Once it decides which
children to prune, it sends prune messages to all these children. These children then run
the self-healing protocol by their own.
Self-healing Failure Occasionally, the self-healing protocol can not successfully iden-
tify a feasible secondary path. This could happen if the group capacities of all the neigh-
bors’ tree have reached the security constraint. In such cases, the disconnected MD should
notify the SA about the failure. Therefore, we allow the disconnected MD to broadcast a
disconnect message with its signature to all the neighbors. This message is relayed to SA
and SA should recompute the forest if there is a feasible solution.
5. Precomputing Data Collection Forest
In this section, we describe how data collection forest is constructed in the tree compu-
tation phase. We formulate the problem as a Resilient Data Collection Forest Problem
(RDCFP) using mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) and solve it by the Gurobi
Solver [24].
5.1. Problem Description
We assume that SA knows the locations of all MDs and selects a set of roots such that a
possible forest exist. We denote the topology of MDs as a directed graph G = 〈R,M ,E 〉,
where R is the set of root candidates, M is the set of MDs and E is the set of edges. If
MDi and MD j can communicate directly without the help of any relay, two directed edges
ei, j and e j,i are present in E . The edges are unweighted so that the length of a path is equal
to the hop count.
Our objective is to minimize the time to collect data from every tree root. Since
the data on each tree can be collected simultaneously, the data collection time of the
whole forest depends on the maximum height of all trees. The height of each tree can be
calculated by the depth-first search (DFS) algorithm.
5.2. Problem Formulation
Before introducing the detail, we describe the general idea of the formulation. We address
the objective of minimizing data collection time from a “path” perspective. Let Pki j be
the k-th pre-computed path from MDi to MD j with minimum length Li, j, and useKi j as
a set of indices of all these paths. Then, the time to collect data from a subtree rooted at
MD j depends on the longest path on the subtree
H j = max
i∈M ∑k∈Ki j
xki jLi j, (2)
where xki j is an indicator variable such that
xki j =
{
1, ifPki j is selected as a path from MDi to MD j;
0, otherwise.
Thus, the time to collect data from all the candidate roots can be expressed as
max j∈RH j.
Now, we formally present the Resilient Data Collection Tree Problem (RDCTP)
as follows:
minmaxxki jLi j (3)
s.t. ∑
j∈R, k∈Ki j
xki j = 1,∀i ∈M (4)
xki j ≤ xli′ j if Pli′ j ⊂ Pki j (5)
∑
i∈M , k∈Ki j
xki j log(1− pi)≥ log(1−Pth),∀ j ∈R (6)
The intuition of these constraints can be interpreted as follows:
(4) Every MD has a valid primary path to some candidate roots.
(5) The selected paths should together form a forest of trees. This constraint ensures
that if a path Pki j is selected, its subpath P
l
i′ j′ must be selected. Therefore, the
computed graph will be a tree.
(6) The accumulative leakage probability of MDs in the same tree is upper-bounded
by the security threshold.
6. Simulation
In this section, we describe how we evaluate the self-healing protocol. First, we generate
the network topologies for refinery sensor networks. Then, we inject large scale failures
into the network and measure the success rate of self-healing as well as the data collection
time. We use Gurobi Solver [24] to get the optimal solution for RDCFP for comparison.
Unfortunately, for large networks that are used in our simulation, it takes too long for
the solver to generate solutions. We thus only consider a subset of shortest paths (sub-
set approach) instead of all shortest paths (full path approach) described in the problem
formulation. We measure the difference in performance of the subset approach with the
optimal solution on small networks that are around 100 nodes. In the 200 topologies we
tested, the results of subset approach and full path approach are identical.
6.1. Topology Generation
The most important intuition we follow to generate our sensor topologies is that, the
sensors are often attached around pipes. These pipes often have linear structure and they
are usually deployed horizontally. Therefore, instead of placing MDs randomly in a 3D
space, we first generate some pipes and then place the MDs along these pipes.
Specifically, we assume that the refinery is a 50m×50m×30m box, and that the
pipes are placed on four horizontal planes with a height difference of 10m. On each plane,
we randomly generate Np horizontal lines of length Lp. These lines are parallel to either
x-axis or y-axis. Then, we place different number of sensors along the lines. For the
sensors on the same pipe, we distributed them with equal distance D so that the following
relationship holds
Nnodes = 4×Np× LpD . (7)
In our simulation, Np ranges from 30 to 48 with a step of 6 and Lp ranges from 25m to
35m randomly.
We identically choose the communication range for all MDs to be 15m, and the
distance between two adjacent MDs on the same pipe to be 12m. We generate four ex-
periment groups with the number of nodes ranging from 360 to 576, where each node has
51.67 to 81.02 neighbors on average. For each group, we generate ten different topolo-
gies. All the metrics are measured as an average of all the ten topologies.
In each topology, we randomly select the key leakage probability of each MD
uniformly in the range [0.008,0.012] . Furthermore, we set the security threshold as
Pth = 0.3 so that on average, each tree can have at most
Nnodes
log(1−0.3)/ log(1−0.01) ≈ Nnodes35.49
nodes. In order to have a feasible solution with high probability, we select m MDs as root
candidates such that m≥ N30 . The m nodes with the most neighbors are selected as roots.
6.2. Failure Injection
To evaluate the performance of self-healing protocol, we inject some random failures into
the network and measure the success rate and data collection time of the self-healing
process. To simulate the real-world failure where sensors fail simultaneously due to some
physical damages to the pipes, we randomly select a coordination in the 3-D space and
fail 2% of the nodes around this location. Note that some failures may not be helpful
in evaluating the self-healing protocol, we selectively discard some failures if one of the
followings is true:
1. All failed MDs are leaf-nodes in the forest. In this case, no predecessors is dis-
connected and self-healing does not happen at all.
2. The network is disconnected by the failure. In this case, it is impossible to con-
struct a data collection forest.
For each topology, we randomly inject Nfail = 1,000 failure instances using the
above criteria.
6.3. Metrics and Baseline
Two metrics are measured in each failure instance. First, we count the number of instances
Nrecover where our self-healing protocol succeeds to recover the network. We refer the
ratio of Nrecover to Nfail as Recovery Success Ratio (RSR). The RSR indicates how likely
our self-healing protocol can recover from a random large scale simultaneous failure.
Second, we use the Maximum Tree Height (MTH) as an indication of the data collection
time. Three measurements are made in the network. Before we inject any failures, we
measure the MTH of the forest. Since the forest is constructed by Gurobi Solver, this
measurement always has smallest MTH. After we inject a failure instance, we remove the
failed nodes from the network and run the Solver again to recompute the optimal MTH of
the remainder network. Then, we run our self-healing protocol on the remainder network,
and measure the MTH after the recovery is done.
We choose the reliable graph routing algorithm of WirelessHART as the baseline
[8]. The reliable graph routing of WirelessHART builds a broadcast graph where each
node has at least two parents to forward its packets. Therefore, it is guaranteed that each
node has at least two paths to the gateway. Note that WirelessHART does not have the
concept of shared key security built in its heart, we relax this constraint in our simulation.
Without the shared key security constraint, the maximum tree height is naturally smaller
because there is no limit on the number of nodes on a tree. Hence, it is not fair to compare
the maximum tree height of these protocols. Instead, we only focus on evaluating the
reliability these protocols.
We construct the reliable graph routing paths and inject the same failure instances
that are used to measure the RSR of self-healing. We count the number of instances
Nconnected that every living node in the reliable graph routing is still connected to at least
one root. Similar to RSR, we use the ratio of Nconnected to Nfail to measure how likely the
reliable graph routing can survive a large scale failure.
6.4. Result and Discussion
Table 1. RSR of Self-healing v.s. Reliable Graph Routing
Nnode Self-healing Reliable Graph Routing
360 91.1% 33.8%
432 92.3% 34.3%
504 92.4% 36.2%
576 93.0% 36.9%
Table 1 shows that our self-healing protocol can successfully recover over 90%
of the injected large scale failures With an increasing node density in the network, our
protocol achieves better RSR. This is expected because the self-healing protocol has a
better chance to succeed if each node has more neighbors. However, reliable graph routing
fails to connect some of the living nodes in most of these cases. This implies that the
reliable graph routing approach is not suitable for dealing with large scale simultaneous
failures.
We calculate the average of MTH over all the injected failure instances for each
topology and show the three MTH measurements in Fig. 2. With a higher density of the
network, the maximum tree height decreases consistently. In the worst case, the optimal
forest reconstructed after failure introduces about 1% extra data collection time. The data
collection time resulted from self-healing is about 7% higher than the optimal reconstruc-
tion. Considering that the computation of optimal forest is costly (it takes about 20 mins
to construct the largest topology with 576 nodes), it is a reasonable tradeoff to recover
connectivity with self-healing protocol.
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7. Conclusion
In this paper, we design a resilient data collection protocol in oil and gas refinery network.
We propose a distributed self-healing mechanism that tolerates multiple simultaneous fail-
ures in a dense network. Through simulation on generated refinery network topologies,
we show that the self-healing protocol can successfully recover most failures with a small
amount of overhead on data collection time.
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